How does the epistemology of colour differ from the ontology of orangeness? The boy wondered as he conducted a phenomenological inquiry of sound’s relation to being via the medium of a whistle. His friend — or his companion, for in a lifeworld of discrete consciousnesses the relations of beings, even in the face of repeated friendly displays, remain notably ambiguous considering the chasm of lonesome individuation separating one from all — gazed at the crowd in the distance, examining it for indications concerning the verities of sociological being-in-the-world.
Meanwhile, an example of the paradox of temporality — a woman whose appearance was old and yet whose previous existence couldn’t strictly be proven due to the fictive nature of time’s linear passage — walked by with a curious object hidden atop her head.
At the same time, behind them (to speak relatively, for there absolute notion of behindness is a conspicuous falsity) a man — we won’t call him strange, for following Camus we can consider strangeness a hallmark of being and thus a vacuous vocable — looked the other way with a certain epistemological certitude.